La Teoría del Diseño de Mecanismos, en el marco de la Teoría de Juegos, es el arte de diseñar reglas de juego para obtener un resultado específico. Se trata de establecer estructuras que incentivan a los jugadores para que se comporten según los objetivos del diseñador.
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Premio a las Ciencias Económicas en Honor de Alfred Nobel
2007
Leonid Hurwicz nació en Moscú, Rusia, en 1917, de una familia de judíos polacos que acababan de llegar como refugiados. Poco después, su familia volvió a Varsovia. En 1938 se graduó en la Universidad de Varsovia y después se fue a estudiar a la London School of Economics. Durante la guerra se refugió en Suiza, desplazándose después a Portugal y los Estados Unidos.
Es ciudadano estadounidense. Es profesor emérito en la Universidad de Minnesota. Obtuvo el Premio Nobel de Economía en 2007, compartido con Eric S. Maskin y Roger B. Myerson por "haber sentado las bases de la teoría de diseño de ecanismos".
La Teoría del Diseño de Mecanismos, en el marco de la Teoría de Juegos, es el arte de diseñar reglas de juego para obtener un resultado específico. Se trata de establecer estructuras que incentivan a los jugadores para que se comporten según los objetivos del diseñador.
Es miembro de la National Academy of Sciences y de la American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Fue presidente de la Econometric Society.
Ver: Leonid Hurwicz: La Teoría del Comportamiento Económico
OBRAS
a.. "Stochastic Models of Economic Fluctuations", 1944, Econometrica
b.. "The Theory of Economic Behavior", 1945, AER.
c.. "Theory of the Firm and of Investment", 1946, Econometrica
d.. "What Has Happened to the Theory of Games?", AER
e.. "Reduction of Constrained Maxima to Saddle-Point Problems" with
K.J.Arrow, 1956, Proceedings of the Third Berkeley Symposium
f.. "Gradient Methods for Constrained Maxima", with K.J. Arrow, 1957,
Operations Research
g.. Studies in Linear and Non-Linear Programming with K.J.Arrow and
Hirofumi Uzawa, 1958.
h.. "On the Stability of Competitive Equilibrium I", with K.J. Arrow,
1958, Econometrica.
i.. "On the Stability of Competitive Equilibrium, II", with K.J. Arrow,
J.D. Block, 1959, Econometrica.
j.. "Competitive Stability under Weak Gross Substitutability: the
Euclidian distance approach" with K.J. Arrow, 1960, IER.
k.. "Some Remarks on the Equilibria of Economic Systems" with K.J. Arrow,
1960, Econometrica.
l.. "Conditions for Economic Efficiency of Centralized and Decentralized
Structures", 1960, in Grossman, editor, Value and Plan.
m.. "Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Allocation",
1960, in Arrow, Karlin and Suppes, editors, Mathematical Methods in Social
Sciences.
n.. "Constraint Qualifications in Non-Linear Programming", with K.J. Arrow
and H. Uzawa, 1961, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly
o.. "On the Problem of Integrability of Demand Functions", 1971, in
Chipman et al, editors, Preferences, Utility and Demand.
p.. "On the Integrability of Demand Functions", with H. Uzawa, 1971, in
Chipman et al, editors, Preferences, Utility and Demand.
q.. "Revealed Preference without Demand Continuity Assumptions", with M.K.
Richter, 1971, in Chipman et al, editors, Preferences, Utility and Demand.
r.. "Centralization and Decentralization in Economic Processes", 1971, in
Eckstein, editor, Computation of Economic Systems.
s.. "On Informationally Decentralized Systems", 1971, in McGuire, and
Radner, editors, Decision and Organization.
t.. "The Design of Mechanism for Resource Allocation", 1973, AER.
u.. Studies in Resource Allocation Processes, with K.J. Arrow, 1977.
v.. "On the Dimensional Requirements of Informationally Decentralized
Pareto-Satisfactory Processes", 1977, JET.
w.. "Ville Axioms and Consumer Theory", with M.K. Richter, 1978,
Econometrica
x.. "Construction of Outcome Functions guaranteeing Existence and
Pareto-optimality of Nash Equilibria", with D. Schmeidler, 1979,
Econometrica .
y.. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash
Equilibrium Points", 1979, RES.
z.. "On Allocations Attainable through Nash Equilibria", 1979, JET.
aa.. "Incentive Aspects of Decentralization", 1986, in Arrow and
Intriligator, editors, Handbook of Mathematical Econ - Vol. III - intro
ab.. "On the Stability of the Tatonnement Approach to Competitive
Equilibrium", 1986, in Sonnenschein, editor, Models of Economic Dynamics
ac.. "On the Implementation of Social Choice Rules in Irrational
Societies", 1986, in Heller et al., editors, Essays in Honor of Kenneth J.
Arrow, Vol. I
ad.. "Discrete allocation mechanisms: Dimensional requirements for
resource-allocation mechanisms when desired outcomes are unbounded.", with
T. Marschak, 1985, J of Complexity
ae.. "Approximating a function by choosing a covering of its domain and k
points from its range", with T. Marschak, 1988, J of Complexity
af.. "Implementation and Enforcement in Institutional Modeling", 1993, in
Barnett et al., editors, Political Economy
ag.. "Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the
Designer Does not Know Endowment or Production Sets" with E. Maskin and A.
Postlewaite, 1995, in Ledyard, editor, Economics of Informational
Decentralization.
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Eric S. Maskin (1950-)
Premio a las Ciencias Económicas en Honor de Alfred Nobel
2007
Eric S. Maskin obtuvo el Premio Nobel de Economía en 2007, compartido con Leonid Hurwicz y Roger B. Myerson por "haber sentado las bases de la teoría de diseño de mecanismos".
La Teoría del Diseño de Mecanismos, en el marco de la Teoría de Juegos, es el arte de diseñar reglas de juego para obtener un resultado específico. Se trata de establecer estructuras que incentivan a los jugadores para que se comporten según los objetivos del diseñador.
Es un economista estadounidense profesor de ciencias sociales en la cátedra Albert O. Hirschman del Instituto de Estudios Avanzados de Princeton.
Cursó su licenciatura y obtuvo el grado de doctor en la Universidad de Harward.
Trabajó como profesor en la Universidad de Cambridge en 1976. De 1980 al 84 fue profesor en el Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Es miembro de la American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Econometric Society, y la European Economic Association. Fue presidente de la Econometric Society en 2003.
OBRAS
a.. "An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract", with P.A.
Diamond 1979, Bell JE
b.. "The Implementation of Social Choice", with P. Dasgupta and P.
Hammond, 1979, RES
c.. "A Differentiable Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms"
with J.J. Laffont, 1979, in Laffont, editor, Aggregation and Revelation of
Preferences
d.. "A Differentiable Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms" with J.J.
Laffont, 1980, Econometrica
e.. "The Theory of Incentives" with J.J. Laffont, 1982, in Hildenbrand,
editor, Advances in Economic Theory
f.. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information", with J. Riley, 1984, Rand JE
g.. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers", with J. Riley, 1984,
Econometrica
h.. "Auction Theory and Private ValueS", 1985, AER
i.. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with
Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria", with R. Radner and R.B.Myerson, 1986, RES
j.. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games", with
P. Dasgupta, 1986, RES
k.. "Optimal Non-Linear Pricing with Two-Dimensional Characteristics" with
J.J. Laffont and J.C. Rochet, 1987, in Groves et al., editors, Information,
Incentives and Economic Mechanisms
l.. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal", with J.
Tirole, 1990, Econometrica
m.. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games", with J. Farrell, 1989, Games and
Econ Behav
n.. "Repeated Games with Long Run and Short Run Players", with D.
Fudenberg and D. Kreps, 1990, RES
o.. "Nash and Perfect Eqilibria of Discounted Repeated Games", with D.
Fudenberg, 1990, JET.
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Premio a las Ciencias Económicas en Honor de Alfred Nobel
2007
Roger B. Myerson es profesor emérito en la Universidad de Chicago. Obtuvo el Premio Nobel de Economía en 2007, compartido con Eric S. Maskin y Leonid Hurwicz por "haber sentado las bases de la teoría de diseño de mecanismos".
La Teoría del Diseño de Mecanismos, en el marco de la Teoría de Juegos, es el arte de diseñar reglas de juego para obtener un resultado específico. Se trata de establecer estructuras que incentivan a los jugadores para que se comporten según los objetivos del diseñador.
Estudió en la Universidad de Harward donde se graduó en matemáticas y obtuvo en 1976 el doctorado en Economía.
Ver su página web:http://home.uchicago.edu/~rmyerson/
Roger B. Myerson: "Los peligros de ir solo"
OBRAS
a.. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games", 1977, Mathematics of Operations
Research
b.. "Refininements of the Nash Equilibrium Concepts", 1978, IJGT
c.. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem", 1979,
Econometrica.
d.. "Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules", 1980, IJGT.
e.. "Optimal Auction Design", 1981, Mathem of Operations Research
f.. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs", with D. Baron, 1982,
Econometrica
g.. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading", with M. Satterthwaite,
1983, JET
h.. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal", 1983, Econometrica
i.. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information",
with B. Holmstrom, 1983, Econometrica
j.. "Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information", 1984, IJGT
k.. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information", 1984,
Econometrica
l.. "Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility: an introduction",
1985, in Hurwicz et al., editors, Social Goals and Social Organization
m.. "Multistage Games with Communication", 1986, Econometrica
n.. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with
Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria", with R. Radner and E.S. Maskin, 1986, RES
o.. "Endogenous Formation of Links between Players and of Coalitions: An
Application of the Shapley value", with R.J. aumann 1988, in Roth, editor,
The Shapley Value.
p.. Game Theory, 1991.
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Fuente: EUMEDNET
* No existe oficialmente un Nóbel de economía, puesto que Alfred Nóbel no lo dejó instaurado.
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